The conduct of the war by sea. Speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill ... on the 15th of February, 1915

THE CONDUCT

OF THE

WAR BY SEA.

LONDONi

DARLING & SON, Limited.

1915.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

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SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

THE RT. HON. WINSTON CHURCHILL,

First Lord of the Admiralty,
ON THE I5th FEBRUARY, 1915.

SUPPLY— NAVY ESTIMATES, 1915-16.
Mr. Churchill's Statement.
Order for Committee read.

The FIRST LORD of the ADMIRALTY (Mr. Churchill) :
After the outbreak of war my Noble Friend Lord Kitchener,
the Secretary of State for War, had to create an Army eight or
ten times as large as any previously maintained or even contem-
plated in this country, and the War Office has been engaged in
vast processes of expansion, improvisation and development
entirely without parallel in military experience. Thanks, how-
ever, to the generous provision made so readily for the last five
years by the House of Commons for the Royal Navy, no such
difficulties or labours have confronted the Admiralty. On the
declaration of war we were able to count upon a Fleet of suffi-
cient superiority for all our needs with a good margin for safety
in vital matters, fully mobilised, placed in its war stations, sup-
plied and equipped with every requirement down to the smallest
detail that could be foreseen, with reserves of ammunition and
torpedoes up to and above the regular standard, with ample sup-
plies of fuel and oil, with adequate reserves of stores of all kinds,
with complete systems of transport and supply, with full numbers
of trained officers and men of all ratings, with a large surplus of
reserved and trained men, with adequate establishments for train-
ing new men, with an immense programme of new construction
rapidly maturing to reinforce the Fleet and replace casualties,
and with a prearranged system for accelerating that new construc-
tion which has been found to yield satisfactory and even sur-
prising results.

I would draw the attention of the House in illustration to only
three particular points. First of all, ammunition. If hon.
Members will run their eye along the series of figures for this
Vote, in the last five or six years, and particularly during
the latter years, they will see an enormous increase in the
Vote. In time of peace one gets little credit for such expendi-
ture, but in time of war we thank God it has been made.
Then, Sir, oil. Most pessimistic prophesies were made as to
the supply of oil, but no difficulty has been found in practice
in that regard. The estimates which we had formed of the
quantity of oil to be consumed by the Fleet in war proved to be

(4175—8.) Wt. 47074— G 4307. 13,000. 3/15. D & S. G. 2. A 2

4

much larger than our actual consumption. On the other hand,
there has been no difficulty whatever in buying practically any
quantity of oil. No single oil ship has been interfered with on
passage to this country. The price of oil to-day is substantially
below what it was when I last addressed the House on this topic.
Indeed we have found it possible to do what we all along wished
to do, but hesitated to decide upon, on account of all the gloomy
prophesies and views which were entertained — we have found it
possible to convert the " Royal Sovereign " to a completely oil
fuel basis, so that this ship equally with the " Queen Elizabeth "
will enjoy the great advantages of liquid fuel for war purposes.

Then as to manning. No more widespread delusion existed
than that although we might build ships we could never find
men to man them. In some quarters of this country the idea
was fostered that when mobilisation took place ships could not
be sent fully manned to sea ; but when mobilisation did take place
we were able to man, as I told the House we should be able to,
every ship in the Navy fit to send to sea. We were able to man
a number of old ships which we did not intend to send to sea,
but which, after being repaired and refitted, were found to have
the possibility of usefulness in them. We were able to man in
addition powerful new vessels building for foreign nations for
which no provision had been made. We were able to man an
enormous number — several score — of armed merchantmen which
had been taken up and have played an important part in our
arrangements for the control of traffic and trade. We were able
to provide all the men that were necessary for the Royal Naval
Air Service which never existed three years ago, which is already
making a name for itself, and which has become a considerable
and formidable body. We were able to keep our training schools
full to the very brim so as to prepare a continual supply of drafts
for the new vessels which are coming on in such great numbers,
and over and above that we were able, without injury to any
of these important interests, to supply the nucleus of instructors
and trained men to form the cadres of the battalions of the Royal
Naval Division which have now reached a respectable total and
which have developed an efficiency which enables them to be
counted on immediately as a factor in the defence of this countrv,
and very soon as an element in the forces which we can use
overseas.

We have never been a military nation, though now we are
going to take a hand in that. We have always relied for our
safety on naval power, and in that respect it is not true to say
we entered on this War unprepared. On the contrary, the
German Army was not more ready for an offensive war on a
gigantic scale than was the British Fleet for national defence.
Ihe credit for this is due to the House, which, irrespective of
party interests has always by overwhelming, and in later vears
unchallengeable majorities, supported the Government and the
Minister m every demand made for naval defence. Indeed, such
disputes as we have had from time to time have onlv been con-
cerned with the margin of superiority, and have turned on com-
paratively small points respecting them. For instance, we have

5

discussed at enormous length what percentages of Dread-
nought " superiority would be available m particular months
in future years, and we have argued whether the " Lord kelsons
should be counted as " Dreadnoughts " or not. The House ot
Commons as a whole has a right to claim the Navy as its child
and as the unchanging object of its care and solicitude ; and now
after six months of war, with new dangers and new difficulties
coming into view, we have every right to feel content with the
results of our labour.

Since November, when I last had an opportunity of speaking
to the House on naval matters, two considerable events have
happened-the victory off the Falkland Islands, and the iml
successful cruiser action near the Dogger Bank. Both of these
events are satisfactory in themselves, but still more are they
satisfactory in their consequences and significance, and 1 shall
venture to enlarge upon them and hang the thread of my argu-
ment upon them° The victory off the Falkland* terminated the
first phase of the Naval War by effecting a decisive clearance
of the German flag from the oceans of the world. The blocking
in of the enemy's merchantmen at tile very outset and the con-
sequent frustration of his whole plans for the destruction of our
commerce, the reduction of his base at Tsing-tau, the expulsion
of his ships from the China Sea by Japan, the hunting down of
?he " Konisberg " and the " Emden," the latter by an Austra-
lian cruiser, were steps along the path to the goal finally reached
when Admiral von Spee's powerful squadron, having been unsuc-
cessfully though gallantly engaged by Admiral Cradoek oft
Coronel, was brought to action and destroyed on 8th December
by Sir boveton Sturdee. Only two small German, cruisers and
two armed merchantmen remain at large of all their formidable
preparations for the attack on our trade routes and these vessel
are at present in hiding. During the last three ^ths-tha
is to say, since Parliament rose-on the average about 8,000
British vessels have been continuously on the sea, passing to and
ho on their lawful occasions. There have been 4,465 arrivals
at and 3 600 sailings from the ports of the United Kingdom
Only nineteen vessels have been sunk by the enemy, and only
four of these vessels have been sunk by above-water craft that
s a very remarkable result to have been achieved after only a few
months^ war. I am sure, if we had been told be ore t^ he War
that such a result would be so soon achieved, and that oui losses
would be so small, we should not have believed it for a moment
Tan qii te sure, if the Noble Lord whom I see m his place (Lord
Charles Beresford), who has always felt, and quite legitimately,
anxiety for the trade rentes and the great difficulty ot defending
fhem-if he had been offered six months ago such a prospect, he
would have said it is too good to be true.

Certainly the great sailors of the past, men of the
■md Napoleonic Wars, would have been astounded During those
two great wars, which began in 1793 and ended, after a brief
interval, in 1814, 10,871 British merchant ships were captured
or sunk by the enemy. Even after the decisive battle of Trafal-
gar when we had the undisputed command ot the sea so far as

6

it can be tactically and strategically attained, the loss of British
ships went on at a rate of over 500 ships a year. In 1806, 519
ships were sunk or captured — that is, the year after Trafalgar;
in 1807, 559 ; in 1808, 469 ; in 1809, 571 ; and in 1810, 619. Our
total losses on the high seas in the first six months of the War,
including all ships other than trawlers engaged in mine-sweeping
— including all ships, including losses by mines and vessels
scuttled by submarines — our losses in the whole of that period
are only sixty-three. Of course, we must always be on the look-
out for another attempt by the enemy to harass the trade routes.
Although the oceans offer rather a bleak prospect to the German
cruisers, and the experience of their consorts is not encouraging,
the Admiralty must be fully prepared for that possibility, and we
shall be able to meet any new efforts with advantages and
resources incomparably superior to those which were at our dis-
posal at the beginning of the War. The truth is that steam
and telegraphs have enormously increased, as compared with
sailing days, the thoroughness and efficiency of superior sea power.
Coaling, communications, and supplies are vital and constant
needs, and once the upper hand has been lost they become opera-
tions of almost insuperable difficulty to the weaker navy. Credit
is due to our outlying squadrons and to the Admiralty organisa-
tion by which they have been directed. It must never be
forgotten that the situation on every sea, even the most remote,
is dominated and decided by the influence of Sir John Jellicoe's
Fleet — lost to view amid the northern mists, preserved by patience
and seamanship in all its strength and efficiency, silent, unsleep-
ing, and, as yet, unchallenged.

The command of the sea which we have thus enjoyed has not
only enabled our trade to be carried on practically without inter-
ruption or serious disturbance, but we have been able to move
freely about the world very large numbers of troops. I am going
to give the House a figure which has no military significance
because so many uncertain factors are comprised within the total,
but which is an absolutely definite figure so far as the work of
the Admiralty Transport Department is concerned. We have
now moved by sea, at home and abroad, including wounded
brought back from the front, including Belgian wounded, includ-
ing Belgian and French troops, moved here and there as' circum-
stances required, often at the shortest possible notice, with
constant changes of plan, across oceans threatened by the enemy's
cruisers and across channels haunted by submarines, to and fro
from India and Egypt, from Australia, New Zealand, Canada
China, South Africa, from every fortress and Possession under
the ( rown, approximately 1,000,000 men without, up to the
present, any accident or loss of life.

We are at war with the second Naval Power in the world
When complaints are made that we have taken too many trans-
ports or armed too many auxiliary cruisers, or made use of too
many colliers or supply ships, I must mention that fact, The
statement that the Admiralty have on charter, approximately,
about one-fifth of the British Mercantile Marine tonnage is correct.
With that we discharge two duties, both of importance at the

7

present time ; first, the supply, fuelling, and replenishing with
ammunition of the Fleets; second, the transport of reinforcements
and supply for the Army in the Field, including- the return of
wounded. It must be remembered in regard to the Fleet that
we have no dockyard or naval port at our backs, and that the bases
we are using during the War have no facilities for coaling from
the shore. We are not like the Germans, living on a great naval
port at Wilhelmshaven, on which £15,000,000 or £10,000,000
has been spent. Rosytk is not finished, and will not be available
for some time. Everything, therefore, required to keep the Fleet
in being — supplies, stores, and, above all, fuel — has to be not
only carried but kept afloat in ships. What are called the " afloat
reserves ' ' — the great mobile reserves of fuel and stores main-
tained at the various bases used by the Fleet — are those which are
fixed by the War Staff and approved by the Board of Admiralty
after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. When those
amounts have been fixed the Transport Department have no choice
but to supply them. It is necessary that there should be sufficient
colliers to enable all the Fleet units at a particular base to coal
simultaneously with a maximum rapidity twice over within a
short interval, and extensive naval movements at high speed may
at any moment necessitate this being put to the test. After two
such coalings there must still be sufficient coal available for
unforeseen contingencies, including delays in bringing further
supplies through storm or foggy weather, or hostile operations
leading to the closing of particular areas of water, or through
the temporary suspension of coaling in South Wales, through
damage to docks, railways, bridges, pits or other local causes.

We cannot possibly run any risk of having the Fleet rendered
immobile. We must make assurance doubly sure. The life of
the State depends upon it and it follows, having always to be ready
for a great emergency, with all the Fleet steaming at once con-
tinuously for days together — having always to be ready for that,
it follows that during periods of normal Fleet movements the
reserves of coal are often and necessarily turned over slowly, and
colliers may in consequence remain at the bases for considerable
periods. That is our system. The fact, therefore, that particular
vessels are noticed by shipowners to be kept waiting about for
long periods is no sign of mismanagement or incapacity on the
part of the Admiralty, but it is an indispensable precaution and
method without which the Fleet could not act in a time of emer-
gency. The position at every home coaling base, and of every
ship,^ is telegraphed to the Admiralty nightly, and a tabulated
statement is issued the same night. This statement is issued as
the basis for a comprehensive daily criticism, with a view to
securing the highest possible economy compatible with and sub-
ject to the vital exigencies of war. So much for the Fleet and its
supply and its coaling.

With regard to the Army, it should be remembered that we are
supplying across the sea, in the teeth of the enemy's opposition, an
Army almost as large as the Grand Army of Napoleon, only vastly
more complex in organisation and equipment. We are also pre-
paring other Armies still larger in number. I do not know on
what day or at what hour the Secretary of State for War will ask

8

the Admiralty to move 20,000 or it may be 40,000 men. It may
be at very short notice. He does not know, until we tell him,
how we shall move them, by what route or to what ports. Plans
are frequently changed on purpose at the very last moment ; it
is imperative for the safety of our soldiers and the reinforcement
of our Armies and the conduct of the War. We have at the
present moment a powerful and flexible machinery which can
move whole Armies with celerity wherever it is desired m a
manner never before contemplated or dreamt of, and I warn
the House most solemnly against allowing grounds of commercial
advantage or financial economy to place any hampering restric-
tion or impediment upon these most difficult and momentous
operations. Careful and prudent administration does not stop
at the outbreak of war. Everything in our power will be done to
enforce it and avoid extravagance. We shall therefore welcome
(he advice of business men on points where they can help us.
Gradually, as we get more and more control of the situation,
higher economy in some respects may be possible, but military
and naval requirements must be paramount, rough and ready
although their demands often are, and they must be served fully
at the cost of all other considerations. I am afraid that I cannot
hold out any hope of any immediate reduction in the tonnage
required by the Admiralty.

I have said that the strain in the early months of the War has
been greatly diminished now by the abatement of distant convoy
work and by the clearance of the enemy's flag from the seas and
oceans. There were times wben, for instance, the great Australian
convoy of sixty ships was crossing the Indian Ocean, or the great
Canadian convoy of forty ships, with its protecting squadrons, was
crossing the Atlantic, or when the regular flow of large Indian
convoys of forty and fifty ships sailing in company was at its
height, both ways when there were half a dozen minor expeditions
being carried by the Navy, guarded and landed at different points
and supplied after landing; when there was a powerful German
cruiser squadron still at large in the Pacific or the Atlantic,
which had to be watched for and waited for in superior force
in six or seven different parts of the world at, once, and when, all
the time, within a few hours' steam of our shores there was con-
centrated a hostile fleet which many have argued in former times
was little inferor to our own ; and when there was hardly a Regular
soldier left at home and before the Territorial Force and the New
Armies had attained their present high efficiency and power — there
were times when our naval resources, considerable as they are, were
drawn out to their utmost limit, and when we had to use old battle-
ships to give strength to cruiser squadrons, even at the cost of
their speed, and when we had to face and to accept risks with
which we did not trouble the public, and which no one would
willingly seek an opportunity to share. But the victory at the
Falkland Islands swept all these difficulties out of existence. It
set free a large force of cruisers and battleships for all purposes;
i( opened (lie way to other operations of great interest; it enabled
a much stricter control and more constant outlook to be main-
tained in Home waters, and it almost entirely freed the outer

9

seas of danger. That was a memorable event, the relief and
advantage of which will only be fully appreciated by those who
have full knowledge of all that has ta'ken place, and will only he
fully appreciated by those who not only knew, but felt, wind was
going forward.

Now, I come to the battle cruiser action on the Dogger Bank.
That action was not fought out, because the enemy, after abandon-
ing their wounded consort, the "Blucher," made good their
escape into water infested by their submarines and mines. But
this combat between the finest ships in both navies is of immense
significance and value in the light which it throws upon rival
systems of design and armament, and upon relative gunnery effi-
ciency. It is the first test we have ever had, and, without depend-
ing too much upon it, I think it is at once important and
encouraging. First of all it vindicates, so far as it goes, the
theories of design, and particularly of big gun armament, always
identified with Lord Fisher. The range of the British guns was
found to exceed that of the German. Although the German shell
is a most formidable instrument of destruction, the bursting,
smashing power of the heavier British projectile is decidedly
greater, and — this is the great thing — our shooting is at least as
good as theirs. The Navy, while always working very hard — no
one except themselves knows how hard they have worked in these
years — have credited the Germans with a sort of super-efficiency
in gunnery, and we have always been prepared for some surprises
in their system of control and accuracy of fire. But there is a
feeling, after the combat of 24th January, that perhaps our naval
officers were too diffident in regard to their own professional skill
in gunnery. Then the guns. While the Germans were building
11-inch guns we built 12-inch and 13^-inch guns. Before they
advanced to the 12-inch gun we had large numbers of ships armed
with the 135. It was said by the opposite school of naval force
that a smaller gun fires faster and has a higher velocity, and there-
fore the greater destructive power — and Krupp is the master
gunmaker of the world — and it was very right and proper to take
such a possibility into consideration. Everything that we have
learnt, however, so far shows that we need not at all doubt the
wisdom of our policy or the excellence of our material. The 135-
inch gun is unequalled by any weapon yet brought on the scene.
Now we have the 15-inch gun, with which the five " Queen
Elizabeths" and the five "Royal Sovereigns" are all armed,
coming into line, and this gun in quality equals the 13'5-inch
gun, and is vastly more powerful and destructive.

There is another remarkable feature of this action to which 1
should like to draw the attention of the House. I mean the steam-
ing of our ships. All the vessels engaged in this action exceeded
all their previous records without exception. I wonder if the
House and the public appreciate what that means. Here is a
squadron of the Fleet which does not live in harbour, but is far
away from its dockyards and which during six months of
war has been constantly at sea. All of a sudden the
greatest trial is demanded of their engines and they all
excel all previous peace-time records. Can you conceive

II)

a more remarkable proof of the excellence of British ma-
chinery, of the glorious industry of the engine-room branch,
or of the admirable system of repairs and refits by which the
Grand Fleet is maintained from month to month and can, if need
be, be maintained from year to year, in a state of ceaseless
vigilance without exhaustion. Take the case of the " Kent "
at the Falklands. The "Kent" is an old vessel. She was
launched thirteen years ago and has been running ever since.
The " Kent " was designed to go 23£ knots. The " Kent " had
to catch a ship which went considerably over 24£ knots. They
put a pressure and a strain on the engines much greater than is
allowed in time of peace, and they drove the " Kent " 25 knots
and caught the " Nurenberg " and sank her. It is my duty
in this House to speak for the Navy, and the truth is that it is
sound as a bell all through. I do not care where or how it may
be tested ; it will be found good and fit and keen and honest.
It will be found to be the product of good management and
organisation, of sound principle in design and strategy, of ster-
ling workmen and faithful workmanship and careful clerks and
accountants and skilful engineers, and painstaking officers and
hardy tars. The great merit of Admiral Sir D. Beatty's action
is that it shows us and the world that there is at present no
reason to assume that, ship for ship, gun for gun, and man for
man, we cannot give a very good account of ourselves. It shows
that a five to four in representative ships — because the quality
of the ships on either side is a very fair representation of the
relative qualities of the lines of battle- — the Germans did not think
it prudent to engage, that they accepted without doubt or
hesitation their inferiority, that they thought only of flight just
as our men thought only of pursuit, that they were wise in the
view they took, and that if they had taken any other view they
would, unquestionably, have been destroyed. That is the cruel
fact, which no falsehood — and many have been issued — no
endeavour to sink by official communiques vessels they could not
stay to sink in war, would have obscured.

When, if ever, the great Fleets draw out for general battle we
shall hope to bring into the line a preponderance, not only in
quality, but in numbers, which will not be five to four, but will be
something considerably greater than that. Therefore, we may
consider this extra margin as an additional insurance against un-
expected loses by mine and submarine, such as may at any
moment occur in the preliminaries of a great sea battle. It is
for these important reasons of test and trial that we must regard
this action of the Dogger Bank as an important and, I think I
may say, satisfactory event. The losses of the Navy, although
small compared with the sacrifices of the Army, have been
heavy. We have lost, mainly by submarine, the lives of about
5,500 officers and men, and we have killed, mainly by gun fire,
an equal number, which is, of course, a much larger proportion
oi the German forces engaged. We have also taken, in sea
fighting, 82 officers and 934 men prisoners of war. No British
naval prisoners of war have been taken in fighting at sea by the
Germans. When they had the inclination they had not the

11

opportunity, and when they had the opportunity they had not
the inclination. For the loss of these precious British lives we
have lived through sis months of this War safely and even
prosperously. We have established for the time being a com-
mand of the sea such as we had never expected, such as we have
never known, and our ancestors had never known at any other
period of our history.

Losses have to be incurred in war, and mistakes will certainly
be made from time to time. Our Navy keeps the sea ; our ships
are in constant movement; valuable ships run risks every day.
, The enemy is continually endeavouring to strike, and from time
to time accidents are inevitable. How do you suppose the battle-
cruiser squadron of Sir David Beatty was where it was when
the action of 24th January took place? How many times is it
supposed that the squadrons of the Grand Fleet, the cruiser and
battle squadrons, have been patrolling and steaming through the
North Sea , always exposed to risk by mine and torpedo before
at last they reaped their reward ? If any mood or tendency of
public opinion arises, or is fostered by the newspapers, or given
countenance to in this House which makes too much of losses,
even if they are cruel losses, and even if it may be said that they
are in some respects avoidable losses, even then I say you will
have started on a path which, pressed to its logical conclusion,
would leave our Navy cowering in its harbours, instead of ruling
the seas. When I think of the great scale of our operations,
the enormous target we expose, the number of skips whose move-
ments have to be arranged for, of the novel conditions to which
I have referred, it is marvellous how few have been our losses,
and how great the care and vigilance exercised by the admirals
afloat and by the Admiralty Staff, and it appears to me, and it
will certainly be regarded by those who study this War in
history, as praiseworthy in the highest degree.

The tasks which lie before us are anxious and grave. We are,
it now appears to be, the object of a kind of warfare which has
never before been practised by a civilised State. The scuttling
and sinking at sight, without search or parley, of merchant
ships by submarine agency is a wholly novel and unprecedented
departure. It is a state of things which no one had ever con-
templated before this War, and which would have been univer-
sally reprobated and repudiated before the War. But it must
not be supposed because the attack is extraordinary that a good
defence and a good reply cannot be made. The statutes of
ancient Rome contain no provision for the punishment of parri-
cides, but when the first offender appeared it was found that satis-
factory arrangements could be made to deal with him. Losses
no doubt will be incurred — of that I give full warning — but
we believe that no vital injury can be done. If our traders
put to sea regularly and act in the spirit of the gallant captain
of the merchant ship " Laertes," whose well merited honour has
been made public this morning, and if they take the precautions
which are proper and legitimate, we expect that the losses will
be confined within manageable limits, even at the outset, when
the enemy must be expected to make his greatest effort to produce
an impression.

12

AJ1 losses can of course be covered by resort on tbe part of
shipowners to the Government insurance scheme, the rates of
which are now one-fifth of what they were at the outbreak of
War. On the other hand, the reply which we shall make will
not perhaps be wholly ineffective. Germany cannot be allowed
to adopt a system of open piracy and murder, or what has always
hither) o been called open piracy and murder on the high seas,
while remaining herself protected by the bulwark of inter-
national instruments which she has utterly repudiated and defied,
and which we, much to our detriment, have respected. There
are good reasons for believing that the economic pressure which
the Navy exerts is beginning to be felt in Germany. We have
to some extent restricted their imports of useful commodities
like copper, petrol, rubber, nickel, manganese, antimony, which
are needed for the efficient production of war materials, and for
carrying on modern war on a great scale. The tone of the
German Chancellor's recent remarks, and the evidences of hatred
and anger against this country which are so apparent in the
German Press, encourage us to believe that this restriction is
proving inconvenient. We shall, of course, redouble our efforts
to make it so. So far, however, we have not attempted to stop
imports of food. We have not prevented neutral ships from
trading direct with German ports. We have allowed German
exports in neutral ships to pass unchallenged. The time has
come when the enjoyment of these immunities by a State which
has, as a matter of deliberate policy, placed herself outside
of all international obligations must be reconsidered. A further
declaration on the part of the allied Governments will promptly
be made which will have the effect for the first time of applying
the full force of naval pressure to the enemy. I thank the
House for the attention with which they have listened to me.
The stresses and strains of this War are not imperceptible to
those who are called on to bear a part in the responsibility for
the direction of the tremendous and terrible events which are
now taking place. They have a right to the generous and indul-
gent judgment and support of their fellow countrymen, and to
the goodwill of the House of Commons. We cannot tell what
lies before us. or how soon or in what way the next great develop-
ments of the struggle will declare themselves, or what the state
of Europe and the world will be at its close. But this, I think,
we can already say, as far as the British Navy is concerned,
that although no doubt new dangers and perplexities will come
upon us continuously and anxiety will make its abode in our
brain, yet the danger and anxiety which now are advancing upon
us will not be more serious or more embarrassing than those
through which we have already successfully made our way.
For during the months that are to come the^British Navy and
the sea power which it exerts will increasingly dominate the
general situation, will be the main and unfailing reserve of the
•illied nations, will progressively paralyse the fighting energies
of our antagonists, and will, if need be, even in default of all
other favourable forces, ultimately by itself decide the issue
of the War.

13

REPLY BY BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE
AMERICAN NOTE OF 16th FEBRUARY.

The communication made by the United States Ambassador iu
bis note to Sir Edward Grey of the 16th instant has been care-
fully considered, and the following observations are offered in
reply : —

2. At the time when His Majesty's Government gave directions
for the seizure of the cargo of the steamship Wilhelmina as con-
traband they had before them the text of the decree made by the
German Federal Council on January 25, under article 45 of
which all grain and flour imported into Germany after January
31 was declared deliverable only to certain organizations under
direct Government control or to municipal authorities. The
vessel was bound for Hamburg, one of the Free Cities of the
German Empire, the government of which is vested in the muni-
cipality. This was one of the reasons actuating His Majesty's
Government in deciding to bring the cargo of the Wilhelniina
before the Prize Court.

3. Information has only now reached them that by a subse-
quent decree, dated February G, the above provision in article 45
of the previous decree was repealed, it would appear for the
express purpose of rendering difficult the anticipated proceedings
against the Wilhelniina. The repeal was not known to His
Majesty's Government at the time of detention of the cargo, or,
indeed, until now.

4. How far the ostensible exception of imported supplies from
the general Government monopoly of all grain and flour set up
by the German Government may affect the question of the contra-
band nature of the shipment seized is a matter which will most
suitably be investigated by the Prize Court.

German Practices.

5. It is, however, necessary to state that the German decree is
not the only ground on which the submission of the cargo of the
Wilhelniina to a Prize Court is justified. The German Govern-
ment have in public announcements claimed to treat practically
every town or port on the English east coast as a fortified place
and base of operations. On the strength of this contention they
have subjected to bombardment the open towns of Yarmouth,
Scarborough, and Whitby, among others. On the same ground,
a number of neutral vessels sailing for English ports on the east
coast with cargoes of goods on the German list of conditional con-
traband have been seized by German cruisers and brought before
the German Prize Court. Again, the Dutch vevssel Maria having
sailed from California with a cargo of grain consigned to Dublin
and Belfast, was sunk in September last by the German cruiser

14

Karlsruhe. This could only have been justified if, among other
things, the cargo could have been proved to be destined for the
British Government or armed forces and if a presumption to this
effect has been established owing to Dublin or Belfast being con-
sidered a fortified place or a base for the armed forces.

6. The German Government cannot have it both ways. If they
consider themselves justified in destroying by bombardment the
lives and property of peaceful civil inhabitants of English open
towns and watering-places, and in seizing and sinking ships and
cargoes of conditional contraband on the way thither, on the
■■round that they were consigned to a fortified place or base, a
fortiori his Majesty's Government must be at liberty to treat
Hamburg, which is in part protected by the fortifications at the
mouth of the Elbe, as a fortified town and a base of operations
and supply for the purposes of article 34 of the Declaration of
London. If the owners of the cargo of the Wilhelmina desire to
question the validity in international law of the action taken by
order of his Majesty's Government, they will have every oppor-
tunity of establishing their case in due course before the Prize
Court, and his Majesty's Government would, in this connexion,
recall the attention of the United States Government to the con-
siderations put forward in Sir E. Grey's note to Mr. Page of the
l()th instant as to the propriety of awaiting the result of Prize
Court proceedings before diplomatic action is initiated. It will
be remembered that they have from the outset given a definite
assurance that the owners of the Wilhelmina, as well as the
owners of her cargo, if found to be contraband, would be equit-
ably indemnified.

No Interference with Food Cargoes.

7. There is one further observation to which his Majesty's
Government think it right, and appropriate in the present con-
nexion, to give expression. They have not, so far, declared food-
stuffs to be absolute contraband. They have not interfered with
any neutral vessels on account of their carrying foodstuffs, except
on the basis of such foodstuffs being liable to capture if destined
for the enemy forces or Governments. In so acting, they have
been guided by (lie general principle, of late universally upheld
by civilized nations, and observed in practice, that the civil popu-
lations of countries at war are not to be exposed to the treatment
rightly reserved for combatants. This distinction has to all
intents and purposes been swept away by the novel doctrines pro-
claimed and acted upon by the German Government.

8. It is unnecessary here to dwell upon the treatment that has
been meted out to the civil population of Belgium, and those parts
of France which are in German occupation. When Germany,
long before any mines had been laid by British authorities, pro-
ceeded to sow mines upon the high seas, and, by this means, sunk
a considerable number not only of British but also of neutral
merchantmen with their unoffending crews, it was, so his
Majesty's Government hold, open to them to take retaliatory
measures, even if such measures were of a kind to involve pressure

15

on the civil population— not indeed of neutral States— but of their
enemies. They refrained from doing so.

9. When, subsequently, English towns and defenceless British
subjects, including women and children, were deliberately and
systematically fired upon and killed by ships flying the flag of
the Imperial German Navy, when quiet country towns and
villages, void of defences, and possessing no military or naval
importance, were bombarded by German airships, his Majesty's
Government stiil abstained from drawing the logical consequences
from this form of attack on defenceless citizens. Further steps
in the same direction are now announced, and in fact have already
been taken, by Germany. British merchant vessels have been
torpedoed at sight without any attempt being made to give warn-
ing to the crew, or any opportunity being given to save their
lives ; a torpedo has been fired against a British hospital ship in
daylight; and similar treatment is threatened to all British
merchant vessels in future as well as to any neutral ships that may
happen to be found in the neighbourhood of the British Isles.

Reprisals Foreshadowed.

10. Faced with this situation, his Majesty's Government con-
sider it would be altogether unreasonable that Great Britain and
her Allies should be expected to remain indefinitely bound, to
their grave detriment, by rules and principles of which they
recognize the justice if impartially observed as between belli-
gerents, but which are at the present moment openly set at
defiance by their enemy.

11. If therefore his Majesty's Government should hereafter feel
constrained to declare foodstuffs absolute contraband, or to take
other measures for interfering with German trade, by way of
reprisals, they confidently expect that such action will not be
challenged on the part of neutral States by appeals to laws and
usages of war whose validity rests on their forming an integral
part of that system of international doctrine which as a whole
their enemy frankly boasts the liberty and intention to disregard,
so long as such neutral States cannot compel the German Govern-
ment to abandon methods of warfare which have not in recent
history been regarded as having the sanction of either law or
humanity.

16

SPEECH

DELIVERED BY

THE RT. HON. H. H. ASQUITH,

British Prime Minister,
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
ON THE 1st MARCH, 1915.

The PRIME MINISTER (Me. Asqtjith) : At the outbreak of
the War the ordinary Supply on a peace basis had been voted
by the House, and consequently the Votes of Credit for the now
current financial year, like those on all previous occasions, have
been taken in order to provide the amounts necessary for naval
and military operations in addition to the ordinary Grants of
Parliament. It consequently follows that the expenditure
charged or chargeable to Votes of Credit for this financial year
represent, broadly speaking, the difference between the expen-
diture of the country on a peace footing and that expenditure
upoD a war footing. The total on that basis, if this Supple-
mentary Vote is assented to, will be £362,000,000.

For reasons the validity of which the Committee has recognised
on previous occasions I do not think it desirable to give the precise
details of the items which make up the total; but without enter-
ing into that, I may roughly apportion the expenditure. For the
Army and the Navy, according to the best Estimates which can
at present be framed, out of the total given there will be required
approximately £275,000,000. That is also in addition, as I have
already pointed out, to the sum voted before the "War for the
Army and Navy, which amounted in the aggregate to a little
over £80,000,000. That leaves unaccounted for a balance of
£87,000,000, of which approximately £38,000,000 represents
advances for war expenditure made or being made to the self-
governing Dominions, Crown Colonies, and Protectorates. In
addition to that sum of £38,000,000, there has been an advance
to Belgium of £10,000,000, and to Servia of £800,000. Further
advances to these Allies are under consideration, the details of
which it is not possible yet to make public. The balance of,
roughly, £38,000,000 is required for miscellaneous services
covered by the Vote of Credit which have not yet been separately
specified.

I think the Committee will be interested to know what the
actual cost of the War will have been to this country, as far as
we can estimate, on the 31st March, the close of the financial
year. The War will then have lasted 240 days, and the Votes of
Credit up to that time, assuming this Vote is carried, will amount

17

to £362,000,000. It may be said, speaking generally, that the
average expenditure from Votes of Credit will have been' roughly,
£1,500,000 per day throughout the time. That, of course, i"s the
excess due to the War over the expenditure on a peace footing.
That represents the immediate charge to the taxpayers of this
country for this year. But, as the Committee know, a portion
of the expenditure consists of advances for the purpose of assist-
ing or securing the food supplies of this country, and will be
recoverable in whole, or to a very large extent, in the near future.
A further portion represents advances to the Dominions and to
other States which will be ultimately repaid. If these items are
excluded from the account the average per day of the War is
slightly lower; but, after making full allowance for all the items
which are in the nature of recoverable loans, the daily expenditure
does not work out at less than £1,200,000. I have spoken of the
average : these figures are the average taken over the whole period
from the outbreak of war; but at the outbreak of war, after the
initial expenditure on mobilisation had been inc urred, the daily
expenditure was considerably below the average, as many charges
had not yet matured. The expenditure has risen steadily, and
is now well over the daily average that I have given. To that
figure must be added, in order to give a complete account of the
matter, something for war services other than naval or military.
At the beginning of the year these charges were not likely to be
very considerable, but it will probably be within the mark to say
that on the 1st April we shall be spending over £1,700,000 a day
above the normal in consequence of the War.

Perhaps I may now say something concerning the Vote of
Credit for the ensuing year, which amounts to £250,000,000.
This Vote of Credit has two features which I believe are quite
unique and without precedent. In the first place, it is the largest
single Vote on record in the annals of this House, and secondly, it
provides for the ordinary as well as for the emergency expendi-
ture of the Army and the Navy. The House may ask on what
principle or basis has this sum of £250,000,000 been arrived at?
Of course it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to give any exact-
estimate, but as regards the period, so far as we can forecast it,
for which this Vote is being taken, it has been thought advisable
to take a sum sufficient, so far as we can judge, to provide for
all the expenditure which will come in course of payment up to,
approximately, the second week in July — that is to say, a little
over three months, or, to put it in another way, something like
one hundred days of war expenditure. As regards the daily rate
of expenditure — I have dealt hitherto with the expenditure up
to 31st March — the War Office calculate that at the beginning of
April, 1915, the total expenditure on Army services will be at the
rate of one and a half millions per day — with a tendency to
increase. The total expenditure on the Navy at the commence-
ment of April will, it is calculated, amount to about £400,000
per day. The aggregate expenditure of the Army and Navy
services at the beginning of 1915-16 is put at £1,900,000 per day
— with a tendency to increase ; for the purposes of our Estimate
the figures we have taken indicate a level two millions per day.

4175

i;

18

The Committee will remember — I am not sure whether I men-
tioned the figure— that on a peace footing the daily expenditure
of the Army and the Navy, on the basis of the Estimates approved
last year, was about £220,000 per day. The difference, therefore,
between £2,000,000 and £220,000 represents what we estimate
to be the increased expenditure due to the War during the one
hundred days for which we are now providing.

There are other items belonging to the same category as those
to which I have already referred in dealing with the Supplemen-
tary Vote. With regard to advances to our own Dominions and
other States for which provision has also had to be made, the
balance of the total of £250,000,000 for which we are now asking
beyond the actual estimated expenditure for the Army and the
Navy will be applied to those and kindred emergency purposes.

Before I pass from the purely monetary aspect of the matter,
it may be interesting to the Committee to be reminded of what
lias been our expenditure upon the great wars of the past. In
the Great War, which lasted for over twenty years, from 1793 to
1815, the total cost as estimated by the best authorities, was
£831,000,000. The Crimean War may be put down, taking
everything into account, at £70,000,000. The total cost of the
war charges in South Africa from 1899 to 31st March, 1903, were
estimated, in a Return presented to Parliament, at £211,000,000.
These are instructive figures.

In presenting these two Votes of Credit the Government are
making a large pecuniary demand on the House — a demand which
in itself is beyond comparison larger than has ever been
made in the House of Commons by any British Minister in the
whole course of our history. We make it with the full conviction
that, after seven months of Avar, the country and the whole
Empire are every whit as determined as they were at the outset — if
need be at the cost of all we can command both in men and in
money — to bring a righteous cause to a triumphant issue. There
is much in what we see to encourage and to stimulate us.
Nothing has shaken, and nothing can shake, our faith in the
unbroken spirit of Belgium, in the undefeated heroism of in-
domitable Serbia, in the tenacity and resource with which our
two great Allies — one in the West and the other in the East —
hold their far-flung lines, and will continue to hold them till the
hour comes for an irresistible and decisive advance. Our own
Dominions and our great Dependency of India have sent us
splendid contributions of men, a large number of whom are
already at the front , and before very long, in one or another of the
actual theatres of war, the whole of them will be in the fighting
line. We -hear to-day with great gratification that Princess
Patricia's Canadian Regiment has been doing, during these last
few days, most gallant and efficient service.

We have no reason to be otherwise than satisfied with
the progress of recruiting here at home. Territorial divi-
sions, now fully trained, are capable— I say it advisedly
- of confronting any troops in the world. The New Armies,
which have lately been under the critical scrutiny of
sk]lled observers, are fast realising all our most sanguine

19

hopes. A war carried on upon this gigantic scale, and under
conditions for which there is no example in history, is not always
or every day a picturesque or spectacular affair. Its operations
are of necessity, in appearance, slow and dragging. Without
entering into strategic details, I can assure the Committee that,
with all the knowledge and experience which we have now gained.
His Majesty's Government have never been more confident than
they are to-day of the power as well as the will of the Allies to
achieve ultimate and durable victory.

I will not enter in further detail into what I may call the
general military situation, but I should, for a few moments, like
to call the attention of the Committee to one or two aspects of the
War which of late have come prominently into view. I will
refer first to the operations which are now in progress in the
Dardanelles. It is a good rule in war to concentrate your
forces on the main theatre, and not to dissipate them in discon-
nected and sporadic adventures, however promising they may
appear to be. That consideration. I need hardly say, has not
been lost sight of in the counsels of the Allies. There has been,
and there will be, no denudation or impairment of the forces
which are at work in France and Flanders, and both the French
and ourselves will continue to give them the fullest and, we
believe, the most effective support.

Nor — what is equally important — has there, for the purpose
of these operations, been any weakening of the Grand Fleet.
The enterprise which is now going on, and so far has gone on in
a manner which reflects, as the House will agree, the highest
credit on all concerned, was carefully considered and conceived
with very distinct and definite objects — political, strategic, and
economic. Some of these objects are so obvious as not to need
statement, and others are of such a character that it is perhaps
better for the moment not to state them. But I should like to
advert for a moment, without any attempt to forecast the future,
to two features in this matter. The first is, that it once more
indicates and illustrates the close co-operation of the Allies — in
this case the French and ourselves — in a new theatre, and under
somewhat dissimilar conditions to those which have hitherto
prevailed. We welcome the presence of the splendid contingent
from the French Navy that our Allies have supplied, and whicli is
sharing to the full in both the hazards and the glories of the
enterprise.

The other point on which, I think, it is worth dwelling for a
moment is that this operation shows in a very significant way
the copiousness and the variety of our own Naval resources. In
order to illustrate that remark, take the names of the ships which
have been actually mentioned in the dispatches we have published.
First the " Queen Elizabeth," the first ship to be commissioned of
the newest type of what are called super-" Dreadnoughts," with
guns of a power and a range never hitherto known in naval war-
fare. Side by side with her is the " Agamemnon," the immediate
predecessor of the " Dreadnought," and in association with them
are the "Triumph," " Cornwallis," "Irresistible," "Ven-
geance," and "Albion." representing, I think I am right in

20

saying, three or tour different types of the older pre-' Dread-
nought " battleships, which have been so foolishly and so pre-
maturely regarded in some quarters as obsolete or negligible, all
bringing to bear the power of their formidable 12-in. guns on
the fortifications with magnificent accuracy and with deadly effect.
When, as I have said, these proceedings are being conducted,
so far as the Navy is concerned, without subtraction of any sort
or kind from the strength or effectiveness of the Grand Fleet, 1
think a word of congratulation is due to the Admiralty for the
way in which it has utilised its resources.

1 pass from that to another new factor in these military and
naval operations — the so-called German blockade of our coast.
1 shall have to use some very plain language. I may, perhaps,
preface what I have to say by the observation that it does not
come upon us as a surprise. This War began on the part of
Germany with the cynical repudiation of a solemn Treaty on
the avowed ground that, when a nation's interests require it, right
and good faith must give way to force. The War has been
carried on on their part with a systematic — not an impulsive or
a casual -but a systematic violation of all the conventions and
practices by which international agreement had sought to mitigate
and regularise the clash of arms. She has now — I will not say
reached the climax, for we do not know what may yet be to
ooine— but she has taken a further step, without any precedent in
history, by mobilising and organising, not on the surface, but
under the surface of the sea, a campaign of piracy and pillage.
Are we — can we — and here I address myself for the moment to
the neutral countries of the world — are we to sit quiet, or can
we sit quiet, as though we were still under the protection of
I lie restraining rules and the humanising usages of civilised war?
We think we cannot. The enemy, borrowing what I may, per-
haps, call for this purpose a neutral flag from the vocabulary
of diplomacy, describes this newly adopted measure by a
grotesque and puerile perversion of language as a blockade.
What is a blockade? A blockade consists in sealing up the war
ports of a belligerent against sea-borne traffic, by encircling their
coast with an impenetrable ring of ships of war. Where are these
ships of war? Where is the German Navy? What has become
of those gigantic battleships and cruisers on which so many
millions of money have been spent, and in which such vast
hopes and ambitions have been invested? I think, if my memory
serves me, they have only twice during the course of these seven
months been seen upon the open sea. Their object in both
cases was the same — murder and mutilation of civilians, and the
wholesale destruction of property in undefended seaside towns,
and on each occasion when they caught sight of the approach
of a British force they showed a (dean pair of heels, and hurried
back at the top of their speed to the safe seclusion of their mine-
fields and their closely guarded forts.

Loed ROBERT CECIL : Not all.

Mr. AKQUITH: Some of them suffered on the way. The
plain truth is, the German Fleet is not blockading," cannot

21

blockade, and never will blockade our coasts. I propose now to
read to tbe Committee the Statement which has been prepared
by His Majesty's Government, and which will be public property
to-morrow, which declares, I hope in sufficiently plain and uuinis-
takable terms, the view which we take, not only of our rights,
but of our duties. It is not very long, and I think I had better
read it textually.

"Germany has declared that the English Channel, the
north and west coasts of France, and the waters round the
British Isles are a ' war area,' and has officially notified that
' all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed, and
that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger.' This is in
effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the safety
of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any
flag. As it is not in the power of the German Admiralty to
maintain any surface craft in these waters, this attack can
only be delivered by submarine agency. The law and custom
of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always
presumed that the first duty of the captor of a merchant
vessel is to bring it before a Prize Court, where it may be
tried, where the regularity of the capture may be challenged,
and where neutrals may recover their cargoes. The sinking
of prizes is in itself a questionable act, to be resorted to only
in extraordinary circumstances and after provision has been
made for the safety of all the crew or passengers (if there
are passengers on board). The responsibility for discriminat-
ing between neutral and enemy vessels, and between neutral
and enemy cargo, obviously rests with the attacking ship,
whose duty it is to verify the status and character of the
vessel and cargo, and to preserve all papers before sinking
or even capturing it. So also is the humane duty of provid-
ing for the safety of the crews of merchant vessels, whether
neutral or enemy, an obligation upon every belligerent. It
is upon this basis that all previous discussions of the law
for regulating warfare at sea have proceeded.

" A German submarine, however, fulfils none of these
obligations. She enjoys no local command of the waters in
which she operates. She does not take her captures within
the jurisdiction of a Prize Court. She carries no prize crew
which she can put on board a prize. She uses no effective
means of discriminating between a neutral and an enemy
vessel. She does not receive on board for safety the crew
of the vessel she sinks. Her methods of warfare are therefore
entirely outside the scope of any of the international instru-
ments regulating operations against commerce in time of
war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate
destruction for regulated capture.

" Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful
traders and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of
preventing commodities of all kinds (including food for the
civil population) from reaching or leaving the British Isles
or Northern France. Her opponents are, therefore, driven

22

to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to pre-
vent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving
Germany. These measures will, however, he enforced by
the British and French Governments without risk to neutral
ships or to neutral or non-combatant life, and in strict obser-
vance of the dictates of humanity.

" The British and Trench Governments will therefore hold
themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying
goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin.
11 is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless
I hey would otherwise be liable to condemnation.

" The treatment of vessels and cargoes which have sailed
before this date will not be affected."
That, Sir, is our reply. I may say, before I comment upon
it, with regard to the suggestion which I see is put forward from
a German quarter that we have rejected some proposal or sug-
gestion made to the two Powers by the United States Government,
1 do not say anything more than that it is quite untrue. On the
contrary, all we have said to the United States so far is, that we
are taking it into careful consideration in consultation with our
Allies.

Now, the Committee will have observed, from the statement I
have just read out of the retaliatory measures we propose to adopt,
the words "blockade" and "contraband," and other technical
terms of international law, do not occur, and advisedly so. In
dealing with an opponent who has openly repudiated all the
principles, both of law and of humanity, we are not going to
allow our efforts to be strangled in a network of juridical niceties.
\\ e do not intend to put into operation any measures which we
do not think to be effective, and I need not say we shall carefully
avoid any measures which violate the rules either of humanity or
of honesty. Subject to those two conditions I say to our enemy—
I say it on behalf of the Government, and I hope on behalf of
the Hons,, of Commons— that under existing conditions there is
no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider our-
selves entitled to resort. If. as a consequence, neutrals suffer
inconvenience and loss of trade we regret it, but we beg them to
remember that this phase of the War was not initiated by us
\ e do not propose either to assassinate their seamen or to destroy
their goods, and what we are doing we do solely in self-defence
1C again as is possible, hardship is caused to the civil and non-
combatant population of the enemy by the cutting off of supplies,
we are not doing more in this respect than was done in the days
w hen Germany still acknowledged the authority of the law of
nations, sanctioned by the practice of the first and the greatest of
her ( hancellors, and by the express declarations of his successor
We are quite prepared to submit to the arbitrament of neutral
opxmon and still more to the verdict of impartial bistort L th£
Vjai hat m the circumstances m which we have been placed
- W been moderate and restrained, we have abstained from
i u' W6r 1,r0i0kTd and ten*ted t0 d0> ™* we

™z:t?£L,^tZt£ r— nds itself to — *

23

I his new aspect of the War only serves to illustrate and In
emphasise the truth that the gravity and the magnitude of the
task we have undertaken does not diminish, but increases as the
months go by. The call for men to join our fighting' forces,
which is our primary need, has been and is being nobly responded
to here at home and throughout the Empire. That call, we say
with all plainness and directness, was never more urgent' or more
imperious than to-day. But this is a war not only of men, but
of material. Take only one illustration. The expenditure of
ammunition on both sides has been on a scale and at a rate which
is not only without precedent, but is far in excess of any expert
forecast. At such a time patriotism has cast a heavy burden
on the shoulders of all who are engaged in trades or manu-
factures which, directly or indirectly, minister to the equipment
of our forces. It is a burden, let me add, which falls, or ought
to fall, with even weight on both employers and employed.
Differences as to remuneration or as to profit, or as to hours and
conditions of labour, which in ordinary times might well justify
a temporary cessation of work, should no longer be allowed to do
so. The first duty of all concerned is to go on producing with
might and main what the safety of the State requires, and, it
this is done, I can say with perfect confidence the Government on
its part will ensure a prompt and equitable settlement of disputed
points, and, in cases of proved necessity, will give, on behalf of
the State, such help as is in their power.

Sailors and soldiers, employers and workmen in the industrial
world are all at this moment partners and co-operators in one
great enterprise. The men in the shipyards and the engineering
shops, the workers in the textile factories, the miner who sends
the coal to the surface, the dockyard labourer who helps to load
and unload the ships, and those who employ and organise and
supervise their labours, are one and all rendering to their country
a service as vital and as indispensable as the gallant men who
line the trenches in Flanders or in France, or who are bombarding
fortresses in the Dardanelles. I hear (sometimes whispers, hardly
more than whispers, of possible terms of peace. Peace is the
greatest of all human blessings, but this is not the time to talk
of peace. Those who talk of peace, however excellent their
intentions, are, in my judgment, victims, I will not say of
wanton, but of grievous self-delusion. It is like the twitter-
ing of sparrows in the stress and tumult of a tempest
which is shaking the foundations of the earth. The time
to talk of peace is when the great tasks in which we and our
Allies embarked on this long and stormy voyage, are within
sight of accomplishment. Speaking at the Guildhall at the Lord
Mayor's banquet last November, I used this language which lias
since been repeated almost in the same terms by the Prime
Minister of France, and which, T believe, represents the settled
sentiment and purpose of the country. I said: —

" We shall never sheath the sword, which we have not
lightly drawn, until Belgium recovers in full measure all,
and more than all, she has sacrificed: until France is

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adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until
the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed
upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military
domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."
What I said early in November, now, after four months, I
repeat to-day. We have not relaxed, nor shall we relax, in the
pursuit of every one and all of the aims which I have described.
These arc great purposes, and to achieve them we must draw
upon all our resources, both material and spiritual. On the one
side, the material side, the demand presented in these Votes is
for men, for money, for the fullest equipment of the apparatus
of war. On the other side, which I have called the spiritual
side, the appeal is to those ancient, inbred qualities of our race
which have never failed us in times of stress, qualities of self-
mastery, self-sacrifice, patience, tenacity, willingness to bear one
another's burdens, the unity which springs from the dominating
sense of a common duly, unfailing faith, inflexible resolve.